The truth about Yugoslavian war 1991-1999

well since you know it........did you know this?

the nazis and the chetniks supported the serbian royal family. And when the chetniks and the nazis were losing to the allies and they realized that the western nations supported tito and not the royal family anymore, and that their Serbian kingdom was forever lost, they switched sides and pretended they were all partisan and that the nazis ran Serbia from 1941-1943. More serbian lies. Nazi serbia was run by Milan Neic and his supreme commander Draza Mihailevic. They were even proud to proclaim that serbia was the 1st state in Europe that was "Juden frei". They even made anti-jewish stamps to commerate it.

[link to www.masonicinfo.com]
Anti-Masonic Hate Stamps

didnt the serbs start the WW1?

On June 2 8th, 1914, in the year following the con*clusion of the Balkan wars, the Archduke Franz Ferdi*nand, heir to the aged Emperor of Austria, was assas*sinated with his wife when on a visit to Sarajevo in Bosnia, a Slav province of Austria which Serbia coveted for her own. Bosnia had formerly been under Turkish rule but had been occupied by Austria, with the agreement of Russia, in 1877. Austria had been granted the further right, acknowledged by the powers in conference at Berlin in 1878, to annex the province whenever she wished. She exercised this right in 1908, for reasons connected with the "Young Turk" revolution of that year in Constantinople. The annexation raised a storm of indignation in Serbia, where there was a clamour for war against Austria. The Archduke Franz Ferdinand, it may be added, was known to be of a liberal and conciliatory disposition and might be expected when he came to the throne, as he obviously soon would in view of his uncle's
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advanced age, to do all he could to reconcile the Slav portions of his Empire to Austrian rule.
The assassination, which the Austrians then be*lieved (and which is now generally agreed) to have been connived at, if not organised, by the Serbian Government, came to the Austrian Government as the culminating provocation of the Serbian chal*lenge. The Austrian statesmen knew that the Serbs had for years been plotting the break-up of the Austrian Empire, and that in this they were being abetted by Russia. Rightly or wrongly, the Austrian authorities came to the conclusion that the assassination of the Archduke marked the decisive point in the Austro-Serbian question. Unless the Austrian Empire was passively to allow itself to be dismembered piecemeal, the time had come to make a stand against Serbian ag*gression. If Serbia's menacing intentions were to be frustrated she must be taught a sharp lesson.
Is Austria seriously to be blamed for adopting this attitude? Not at all. She had a better historical claim to Bosnia than had Serbia, since it had for long periods before the arrival of the Turks been either part of the Western Empire or of the Kingdom of Hungary, now joined with Austria under one Em*peror. For these same historical reasons, the Bosnians were Roman Catholics where they were not Moslems, whereas the Serbs were of the Greek church.
After waiting nearly a month, the Austrians sent Serbia a very stiff note on July 23, 1914, demanding various drastic measures to end anti-Austrian agi*tation and hostile activity.
What would Britain have done? When faced with an analogous situation in Ireland in 1920, she pro*ceeded to act in much the same way as Austria in 1914, by bringing the strongest coercion to bear on the Irish
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Republican Army that was openly trying to free Ire*land from British rule. Long-drawn-out and ruthless operations were conducted against the Irish guerrilla forces, in which terrible atrocities were perpetrated by both sides, on the British mainly by a special force of "Black and Tans" recruited from the gangster types. In the middle of the campaign, Mr. Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, declared publicly that "there would be no shaking hands with murder." Yet in the end he did shake hands with it, partly because it was proving so tough an antagonist in Ireland and partly because the Americans were twisting the lion's tail on the other side of the Atlantic. But had the Prince of Wales been assassinated by Irish gunmen while on a visit to Dublin, it cannot be doubted that the Anglo-Irish struggle would have been even bit*terer and more prolonged.
The peculiar danger of the Austrian action was, of course, that it might involve all Europe in war. Russia was known to be backing Serbia, so that punitive action by Austria against the latter might bring in the Russians. Russia's entry would bring in Germany and perhaps Italy on the side of Austria, which in turn would involve France in support of Russia and pos*sibly Britain too. Was Austria, then, to do nothing against the assassins of her Imperial heir, or nothing to check the continual and avowed sapping by the Serbs of the Imperial foundations? If so, it meant that, faced with unquestionably aggressive intentions on the part of a neighbour, she was to be denied the right to defend herself.
The question of whether Austrian action against Serbia was to result in a general war really depended on Russia's reaction. It Russia abstained from aiding Serbia, peace might be saved. It is known that
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Germany had no wish for war, nor Britain. It is true that Germany did not discourage Austria, anyhow in the early stages of the crisis, from taking dras*tic action against the Serbs. But Germany could hardly have done otherwise. Her whole strategically policy was based on the Triple Alliance of herself, Austria, and Italy. In Italian loyalty she had no confidence, and with just cause. There remained Austria as Germany's probable sole support. It the Serbs were to continue un*hampered their intrigues and plans to destroy the Aus*trian Empire, they might succeed in doing so; and this would leave Germany alone to confront a hostile combination of France, Russia, and probably Britain. It was to Germany's vital interest that the Austrian Empire be kept intact, and therefore that Serb con*spiracies be held under control.
Englishmen of the 1914 generation will recall the then popular view of Germany as the European mili*tary colossus, terrorising other nations by the menace of her huge army. A dispassionate examination of the strategically facts of the case may, however, suggest that the picture looked quite different through German eyes. The pre-war estimates of war strengths of the various armies gave the Franco-Russian combination an excess over the German-Austrian combination that varied from 700,000 to 1,200,000 men; and there is evidence that, in spite of all their seeming arrogance and swashbuckling confidence, the Germans were governed by a genuine fear of Russia's millions of soldiers. This may seem hard to credit in the after-light of the pitiful Russian collapse in the war. But it has to be remembered that dangers seem always partic*ularly formidable in prospect. The British, with a de*cisive lead in naval power, felt anxious enough over the challenge of the inferior German fleet; so anxious
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that the challenge drove them into the arms of France and Russia, the two chief traditional enemies of the British past. No Briton therefore has the right to ques*tion that Germany could have felt grave concern at the menace of the superior Russian Army.* Nor will the reader need to be convinced of the acute concern which has dominated the whole of the Western world, including the United States on the other side of the Atlantic, during the last five to eight years, over the reported huge size of the present-day Russian mili*tary machine.
If, however, Germany had good grounds for regard*ing the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand as pregnant with menace not only to Austria but to herself, there is reason to suppose that to Russia it came as a welcome opportunity. To her it must have appeared as the spark which might be fanned into the flame of that general European war which there is now strong cause to think both she and France had previously determined to provoke, Russia to obtain Constantinople and the Straits and France to regain Alsace and Lorraine. Or not so much Russia and France as Sazanov and Poincare and their respec*tive pro-war supporters; for as Sir Patrick Hastings has said, "war is the creation of individuals not of nations."**
The respective interests of Austria, Germany, and Russia in regard to the assassination crisis should now be fairly plain. Austria believed that Serbian intrigues and ambitions constituted a deadly menace to the continued existence of her Empire, as they un*doubtedly did, and she was aware that she must either
* In 1914, the peace strengths of both the Russian and French armies were greater than that of the German.
* * Sir Patrick Hastings—Autobiography, p. 52.

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curb the capacity of Serbia for further anti-Austrian mischief or see the Empire perish, and that probably soon. And if action had to be taken some time, the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne by admittedly Serbian terrorists offered as favourable an issue on which to base that action as could be ex*pected. The Austrians were therefore determined to force matters to a head. Resolute action at once might succeed. But if not, if it precipitated a European war, it indeed this war were to be disastrous for Austria —well, if the Austro-Hungarian Empire had to go down anyway, it might as well go down fighting. This line of argument may or may not have justified the action that the Austrian authorities took in 1914;
but at least it is an understandable one.
As to Germany, it was to her interest to localise the Austro-Serbian dispute, so that the Serbs might be suitably dealt with by the Austrians without any*one else being involved.* Russia, on the other hand, was interested in the support of Serbia and was also resolved to use the Sarajevo assassination to bring on a general war, as her actions during the crisis clearly indicate.
It has been the fashion among British historians to describe the Serbian reply to the Austrian note as extraordinarily conciliatory, all but two of the Austrian demands being conceded. The present author does not take that view. The two rejected demands were the key ones that alone could have made the rest effective. All the remainder, even if nominally complied with, could easily have been evaded in prac*tice and reduced to nullity by the Serbs. The Serbian
* One of the proposed Austrian means of doing so, which might or might not have been carried out in practice, was to distribute portions of Serb territory among the Bulgars, Greeks and Rumanians.

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Two hours later, Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia to cancel her mobilisation. This ultimatum may seem to put the responsibility for the actual com*mencement of the general war on Germany's shoul*ders. But, in fairness, there is this to be said for her. The total mobilisation of two countries in the state of near hostility to each other that Russia and Ger*many were at this time meant, as all the then Gen*eral Staffs were agreed, inevitable war between them. If war were to come, it was naturally of vital impor*tance for each country concerned to gain every pos*sible advantage it could for the success of its own arms. One of the cardinal advantages Germany had over Russia was a more efficient and quicker mobilisation system, and to make full use of that advantage Ger*many needed to strike at her enemy the instant her mobilisation was complete. This was particularly so in regard to a more numerous enemy like Russia who, if given time to complete her mobilisation before be*ing attacked, would be able to bring her greater num*bers to bear with the most effect. Actually, the German plan for a Franco-Russian war was to demolish the French first, and turn on the Russians second. But the time factor remained just as urgently important. Hence, the necessity for the German ultimatum. The Russians, if left to themselves, would probably delay the declaration of war until all their far-flung man*power had assembled on the German frontier, and the German advantage of quicker mobilisation had thus been eliminated. It was vitally important for the Ger*mans to forestall them.
It is, I think, fairly clear that the progress towards a general European flare-up was determined by Russia. Had she not mobilised, it can be taken as fairly cer-
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tain that Germany would not have done so either;
and as long as neither Russia nor she had taken this final and fatal step, there was always a chance of the Austro-Serbian war being localised. The Russian initiative in mobilisation was not forced upon her by compelling necessity. Her security was in no wise threatened by the Austro-Serbian conflict. The Austrians had even assured the Russian Government that any punitive measures they might adopt against Serbia did not include the acquisition of Serbian ter*ritory for themselves; and though the Russians could legitimately have disbelieved them, we know that the Austrian Ministers were opposed to the inclusion of any more of those turbulent Serbs in the Empire. In any case, the Austro-Serb situation could obviously develop a long way before Russia's own safety began to be in jeopardy. But Russia would not wait; and there is no doubt that her precipitate mobilisation was determined by ambition and not by fear. And Y J^ also by the confident assurance of French support.*
At this point, we come back to the question of France and the "butcher-bird." This was the second occasion on which, according to the legend, innocent France was wantonly attacked by a predatory Ger*many. At the same time as they sent their ultimatum to Russia, the Germans sent one also to France, well aware of the Franco-Russian alliance and knowing that hostilities against Russia would involve also hos*tilities against France. Since this was an inevitable outcome of the situation that had arisen, one might think that the French, it they had been anxious to avoid war, would have put pressure on their Russian
* Gooch and Temperley—"British Documents on the Origin of the War," No. 125.

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Two hours later, Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia to cancel her mobilisation. This ultimatum may seem to put the responsibility for the actual com*mencement of the general war on Germany's shoul*ders. But, in fairness, there is this to be said for her. The total mobilisation of two countries in the state of near hostility to each other that Russia and Ger*many were at this time meant, as all the then Gen*eral Staffs were agreed, inevitable war between them. If war were to come, it was naturally of vital impor*tance for each country concerned to gain every pos*sible advantage it could for the success of its own arms. One of the cardinal advantages Germany had over Russia was a more efficient and quicker mobilisation system, and to make full use of that advantage Ger*many needed to strike at her enemy the instant her mobilisation was complete. This was particularly so in regard to a more numerous enemy like Russia who, if given time to complete her mobilisation before be*ing attacked, would be able to bring her greater num*bers to bear with the most effect. Actually, the German plan for a Franco-Russian war was to demolish the French first, and turn on the Russians second. But the time factor remained just as urgently important. Hence, the necessity for the German ultimatum. The Russians, if left to themselves, would probably delay the declaration of war until all their far-flung man*power had assembled on the German frontier, and the German advantage of quicker mobilisation had thus been eliminated. It was vitally important for the Ger*mans to forestall them.
It is, I think, fairly clear that the progress towards a general European flare-up was determined by Russia. Had she not mobilised, it can be taken as fairly cer-
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tain that Germany would not have done so either; and as long as neither Russia nor she had taken this final and fatal step, there was always a chance of the Austro-Serbian war being localised. The Russian initiative in mobilisation was not forced upon her by compelling necessity. Her security was in no wise threatened by the Austro-Serbian conflict. The Austrians had even assured the Russian Government that any punitive measures they might adopt against Serbia did not include the acquisition of Serbian ter*ritory for themselves; and though the Russians could legitimately have disbelieved them, we know that the Austrian Ministers were opposed to the inclusion of any more of those turbulent Serbs in the Empire. In any case, the Austro-Serb situation could obviously develop a long way before Russia's own safety began to be in jeopardy. But Russia would not wait; and there is no doubt that her precipitate mobilisation was determined by ambition and not by fear. And also by the confident assurance of French support.*
At this point, we come back to the question of France and the "butcher-bird." This was the second occasion on which, according to the legend, innocent France was wantonly attacked by a predatory Ger*many. At the same time as they sent their ultimatum to Russia, the Germans sent one also to France, well aware of the Franco-Russian alliance and knowing that hostilities against Russia would involve also hos*tilities against France. Since this was an inevitable outcome of the situation that had arisen, one might think that the French, it they had been anxious to avoid war, would have put pressure on their Russian
* Gooch and Temperley—"British Documents on the Origin of the War," No. 125.

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allies not to force the issue? But the French not only had taken no mollifying action of this kind at St. Petersburg; they actually, though secretly, encour*aged the Russians on to extreme measures.
Why did the French thus work for war? For two reasons. When M. Poincare became President in 1912, he made it clear to the Russians that they could count on French military support in all circumstances,* whether Russia were being attacked or whether she herself were doing the attacking. And this comprehen*sive assurance of the President's was undoubtedly due to his determination to bring on a general war as the only way of recovering Alsace and Lorraine, and to the prevailing belief on the part of the French Gen*eral Staff that France and Russia would beat Germany and Austria.** It was a repetition of 1870. The French Army was once more ready to the last gaiter button: the French Generals supremely confident of victory.
Alas, they had miscalculated for the second time: and for the second time the fault for this cannot be laid at the Germans' door. The French strategy was based on the theory of "the unconditional offensive," the magic qualities of which would quickly carry the French Army to Berlin. But the true qualities of the theory proved to be more suicidal than magical and led mainly to fearful slaughter among the French troops. In a matter of days, the French war plan was in ruins and the French Army, instead of advancing into Germany, was in wholesale retreat towards Paris. The French had also overestimated the military value of their Russian allies, which was revealed as far be*low expectations.
* Lowes Dickinson, "The International Anarchy," pp. 329-354.
** See, inter alia, Benckendorff to Sazanov, 25-2-1913.

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If anyone was to blame for the invasion of France by the Germans in 1914, it was the French themselves. Had their President thrown the weight of his influence into dissuading the Russians from hurrying into warlike preparations, instead of egging them on, it is quite likely there would have been no Arma*geddon. But Poincare and the war party were hanker*ing after revenge for the debacle of 1870, were reso*lutely set on regaining the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and had once again mesmerised themselves into the belief that they were the heirs of the great Napoleon's victorious Grande Armee. They were, in fact, anxious for war.
As for the Germans having started the 1914 war, there could be no greater myth, in the author's opin*ion, based on the available evidence. If any nation could, in his view, be said to have "started" the war in the sense of taking the first steps which led to hos*tilities, it was Serbia for the Austro-Serbian war, and Russia for the larger conflict. Had the Serbs es*chewed their "Greater Serbia" ambitions, there seems to be no reason why they and the Austrians should ever have come into collision. As I see it, the Serbs were the primary aggressors and the original causers of the First World War. But they were closely sec*onded by the Russians, who were the initial agents in converting a local conflict into a global disaster. Whether the Serbs were culpable in planning and working for a "Greater Serbia" object, and the Rus*sians in encouraging them, is another matter alto*gether, which I shall not argue. The point here is whether the Germans "started" the 1914 war, as has often been alleged against them, and I think the truth is otherwise.
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The original participants in that war can be di*vided into two classes: those who looked for positive gain from a European war and those who desired only to keep what they had. In the first class were the Serbs, the Russians, and the French, and two of the three eventually received the booty they coveted. In the second class were the Austrians and the Germans, who for that reason had more to lose and therefore—es*pecially in Germany's case—less incentive to want a general war than the others. In that ill-starred summer of 1914, I should say that of all the European Great Powers those who wanted war the least were the Ger*mans and the British.
So much venom has been hurled against Prussian militarism in the last forty to fifty years that it comes as something of a shock to discover that at the height of the 1914 crisis the German General Staff addressed a memorandum to its Government on July 29, which contained sentiments of a most admirably balanced, farseeing, and statesmanlike character. "Russia has announced," the German Generals said, "that she will mobilise against Austria if Austria invades Serbia. Austria will therefore have to mobilise against Rus*sia. The collision between the two States will then have become inevitable. But that, for Germany, is the casus foederis. She therefore must mobilise, too. Rus*sia will then mobilise the rest of her forces. She will say: T am being attacked by Germany.' Thus, the Franco-Russian Alliance, so often held up to praise as a purely defensive compact, created only to meet the aggressive plans of Germany, will become active and the mutual butchery of the civilised nations of Europe will begin. . . . After this fashion things must and will develop, unless, one might say, a miracle happens to prevent at the last moment a war which will anni-
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hilate for decades the civilisation of almost all Europe." *
Is it possible, after reading the above extract, to continue to regard the German General Staff as noth*ing more than jack-booted, goose-stepping, sabre-rat*tlers; or as a criminal organisation such as the prose*cution at Nuremberg tried to stamp them? Not for me, anyway. I know of no other General Staff at this time that showed any such reluctance as is instinct in the German memorandum. Sir Henry Wilson's Diaries portray him either as licking his lips at the prospect of a war or tearing his hair at the possibility that Britain might not enter it.
The forecast in the German General Staff memo*randum was all too accurate. There was, indeed, only one error. The Russians did not wait for German mo*bilisation to order total mobilisation for themselves. They did it first—by 20 hours.
Finally, let me give the verdicts on the question of war responsibility of three historians, an Englishman, an American, and a Frenchman. The Englishman, G. Lowes Dickinson, sums the question up as follows:
". . . we must inquire which has the greater justifica*tion—a State (Austria) which is defending itself against disruption, or one (Serbia) which is desirous to extend its power by the disruption of its neighbour. That really was the question between Austria and Russia. I should answer myself . . . that the justification lies with Austria and the aggression with Russia.
We next come to Germany. Against her has been di*rected most of the moral indignation of the victorious Powers. That this is not justified by the facts should be clear, after our analysis. . . . The Powers of the Entente
* Quoted by Lowes Dickinson in his International Anarchy, pp. 445 & 448.

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say that the offence was Germany's backing of Austria. Germans say that the offence was Russia's backing of Serbia. . . . To my mind, the German position is the more reasonable."*
Secondly, here is the opinion of the distinguished American historian. Dr. H. E. Barnes. Summarizing the relative responsibility for the war in his detailed study of the evidence. Dr. Barnes says:
"In estimating the order of guilt of the various countries we may safely say that the only direct and immediate responsibility for the world war falls upon Serbia, France and Russia, with the guilt about equally distributed. Next in order—far below France and Russia—would come Aus*tria, though she never desired a general European war. Finally, we should place England and Germany, in the order named, both being opposed to war in the 1914 crisis. Probably the German public was somewhat more favour*able to military activities than the English people, but, as we have amply explained above, the Kaiser made more strenuous efforts to preserve the peace of Europe than did Sir Edward Grey." **
Lastly, the Frenchman, M. Morhardt, has this to say about President Poincare's visit to Russia in July, 1914, at the height of the Sarajevo crisis:
"The fact alone of undertaking such a trip at such a time meant a plan for war. ... If M. Raymond Poincare wanted peace, a letter to St. Petersburg would have suf*ficed. It Russia had been warned that France was resolved not to espouse, before the world, the cause of the assassins at Sarajevo, the whole matter would have been solved

didnt the serbs start the WW1?

Are you Croation?

You are wrong. I hate when Serbs, Bosians or Croats twist facts. Everyone knows the Serbs were killed along with jewish people in the second war. Serbs actually slowed down hilter. if it wasn't for serbs, we'd all be speaking german today.

Croats allied with Germans in the second war. Try history books to get your info. Nice try in twisting the facts. I've heard many tv shows mention how jewish people and Serbs and other groups were killed by hilter. My coworkers serbian grandfather was in a Nazi camp. We were also taught this in school!

You are way off. Don't get your info from websites. Use history books.

I understand you think the world would be a better place without Serbs. Oh and you didn't answer my question about your nationality

you are right i did not answer your question about my nationality....i just thought the flag underneath the username was self explanatory

So dont you have some truths about your homeland? Is everything so nice and rosy there? What about millions of natives that were killed in USA and Canada? Oh i forgot Serbs killed them

the difference is that we learn from our mistakes and the serbs should do the same and apologize to the croats, albanians, bosnians, slovenians, macedonians, hungarians for the tragedy they have caused in the region.

Canada Apologizes To Aboriginal Natives:
[link to www.cbsnews.com]

a must watch video 5*

I guess you serbs have another view of what happened to Libya than many...

Vatican is really on the move now. Thread: Vatican Calls for 'Central World Bank' to Be Set Up